### Description
An integer overflow vulnerability exists in file parsing code of Oracle Outside In Technology libim_gem2 library. A specially crafted Gem file can trigger an integer overflow leading to multiple heap based buffer overflows which can be abused to achieve remote code execution.
### Tested Versions
Oracle Outside In Technology Content Access SDK 8.5.1.
### Product URLs
http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/middleware/content-management/oit-all-085236.html
### Details
While parsing a Gem metafile data an unchecked memory allocation is performed. In function GemText in libimgem library, a 16 bit value read from the file is used in arithmetic operations without checks leading to an integer overflow.
As an example, the vulnerability is triggered in the `ixsample` demo application supplied in the SDK. The supplied minimized testcase crashes due to overwritten heap structures resulting from a buffer overflow enabled by unchecked memory allocation.
Vulnerability is present in function GemText in the libimgem2 library. Significant code excerpt:
```
.text:00006323 push ebp
.text:00006324 push edi
.text:00006325 push esi
.text:00006326 push ebx
.text:00006327 sub esp, 3Ch
.text:0000632A call sub_3D35
.text:0000632F add ebx, 0C321h
.text:00006335 mov ebp, [esp+4Ch+arg_4]
.text:00006339 mov edx, [esp+4Ch+arg_0]
.text:0000633D mov eax, [edx+4]
.text:00006340 mov eax, [eax+4758h]
.text:00006346 mov edx, [eax+8]
.text:00006349 mov [esp+4Ch+var_48], 1
.text:00006351 mov eax, [eax+4]
.text:00006354 mov [esp+4Ch+var_4C], eax
.text:00006357 call dword ptr [edx+134h]
.text:0000635D movsx edi, bp ; [1]
.text:00006360 lea esi, [edi+edi] ; [2]
.text:00006363 lea eax, [esi+5] ; [3]
.text:00006366 mov [esp+4Ch+var_4C], eax ; [4]
.text:00006369 call _memalloc
.text:0000636E mov [esp+4Ch+var_14], eax
.text:00006372 lea eax, [edi+1] ; [5]
.text:00006375 mov [esp+4Ch+var_4C], eax
.text:00006378 call _memalloc
.text:0000637D mov [esp+4Ch+var_18], eax ; [6]
```
The 16 bit value read from a file is sign extended into edi at [1]. At [2] and [3] a size argument for `memalloc` is calculated leading to the first integer overflow. If the value in bp was 0xffff, sign extending if makes edx 0xffffffff, then [2] and [3] overflow this value which ends up in eax and as a parameter to `memalloc`. No check is performed for sane values of size parameter. In case of initial value being 0xffff, the size of allocated memory would be small (3 bytes requested).
Second integer overflow can occur at [5] and, again, an unchecked result is used as a size parameter to `memalloc`. If the initial value was 0xffff, the requested memory size would be 0. Pointer to the allocated memory is saved at [6] and is subsequently used.
Pointer from the second allocation is used as a parameter to the `gem_char_translate` function which,in essence, is tasked with translating one codepage to another. Original size value is also supplied to this function and serves as a counter.
Function `gem_char_translate` can be simply explained with the following pseudo-C:
```
gem_char_translate(char *cp_string,uint16 size){
for(int i; i < size; i++){
if(cp_string[i] < 0x1f){
cp_string[i] = 0x20;
}else if(cp_string[i] > 0x7e){
//change byte according to the codepage
}
}
}
```
If an integer overflow did occur during memory allocation with initial size value of 0xffff, `gem_char_translate` will happily write up to 0xffff bytes starting at the allocated buffer leading to a heap buffer overflow.
By manipulating the heap to place specially crafted values in memory after the wrongfully allocated buffer, arbitrary content can be placed on the heap.
Later on in the code, the `gem_char_translate` translated buffer is used as a source string in a `strcpy()` call which leads to another heap buffer overflow which can be abused to achieve remote code execution. Second heap overflow happens during a `strcpy` call in `imsStrCpy` function. Since the `gem_char_translate` function will, in case of integer overflow, always generate a string of length 0xffff, this buffer overflow can be abused to overwrite different control structures that are present on the heap.
### Timeline
* 2015-10-19 - Discovery
* 2016-04-20 - Initial Vendor Communication
* 2016-07-19 - Public Release
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