# ICS Medical Advisory (ICSMA-20-196-01)
## Capsule Technologies SmartLinx Neuron 2 (Update A)
Original release date: October 20, 2020
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### Legal Notice
All information products included in [https://us-cert.gov/ics](/ics) are
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* * *
## 1\. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
* **CVSS v3 7.6**
* **ATTENTION:** Low skill level to exploit/public exploits are available
* **Vendor:** Capsule Technologies
* **Equipment:** SmartLinx Neuron 2
* **Vulnerability:** Protection Mechanism Failure
## 2\. UPDATE INFORMATION
This updated advisory is a follow-up to the original advisory titled
ICSMA-20-196-01 Capsule Technologies SmartLinx Neuron 2 that was published
July 14, 2020, on the ICS webpage on us-cert.cisa.gov.
## 3\. RISK EVALUATION
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could provide an attacker with
full control of a trusted device on a hospital's internal network.
## 4\. TECHNICAL DETAILS
### 4.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following versions of Capsule Technologies SmartLinx Neuron 2, a medical
device platform, are affected:
**\--------- Begin Update A Part 1 of 2 ---------**
* Capsule Technologies SmartLinx Neuron 2: Firmware Versions 9.0.3 and older
**\--------- End Update A Part 1 of 2 ---------**
### 4.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
#### 4.2.1 [PROTECTION MECHANISM FAILURE
CWE-693](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/693.html)
A restricted environment escape vulnerability exists in the "kiosk mode"
function of Capsule Technologies SmartLinx Neuron 2 medical information
collection devices running
Version 6.9.1. A specific series of keyboard inputs can allow an escape from
the restricted environment, resulting in full administrator access to the
underlying operating system. An attacker can connect to the device via USB
port with a keyboard or other HID device to trigger this vulnerability.
[CVE-2019-5024](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2019-5024)
has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 7.6 has been
calculated; the CVSS vector string is
([AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)).
### 4.3 BACKGROUND
* **CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS:** Healthcare and Public Health
* **COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED:** Worldwide
* **COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION:** United States
### 4.4 RESEARCHER
Patrick DeSantis of Cisco Talos reported this vulnerability to Capsule
Technologies.
## 5\. MITIGATIONS
Capsule Technologies recommends the following mitigations:
**\--------- Begin Update A Part 2 of 2 ---------**
* Update the software to a supported version (v9.0.4 and above) by doing the following:
**\--------- End Update A Part 2 of 2 ---------**
* * Connect the Neuron 2 to the Capsule SmartLinx application server.
* Edit the Neuron Software Reference to include the Neuron software the user wants to update.
* Transfer the Neuron Software to the given Neuron.
* Select Install Neuron Software Reference on the given Neuron.
* The Neuron will drop offline for approximately 30 minutes for the install to complete.
* Restrict physical access to the vulnerable devices and ensure they remain outside of the organization's security perimeter.
* Ensure data communications from the devices are not implicitly trusted by internal systems.
* If possible, physically disable or obstruct access to USB ports on vulnerable devices.
* Monitor logs for signs of connections of unauthorized peripherals to vulnerable devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
CISA also provides a section for [control systems security recommended
practices](https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/recommended-practices) on the ICS
webpage on [us-cert.cisa.gov](https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/ics). Several
recommended practices are available for reading and download, including
[Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth
Strategies](https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-
CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf).
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly
available on the [ICS webpage on us-cert.cisa.gov](https://www.us-
cert.cisa.gov/ics) in the Technical Information Paper, [ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--
Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies](https://www.us-
cert.gov/ics/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B).
> Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
> established internal procedures and report their findings to CISA for tracking
> and correlation against other incidents.
This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.
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