# ICS Advisory (ICSA-18-310-02)
## Rockwell Automation MicroLogix 1400 Controllers and 1756 ControlLogix Communications Modules
Original release date: December 06, 2018
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* * *
## 1\. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
* **CVSS v3 8.6**
* **ATTENTION:** Exploitable remotely/low skill level to exploit
* **Vendor:** Rockwell Automation
* **Equipment:** MicroLogix 1400 Controllers and 1756 ControlLogix Communications Modules
* **Vulnerability:** Missing Authentication for Critical Function
## 2\. REPOSTED INFORMATION
This advisory was originally posted to the HSIN ICS-CERT library on November
6, 2018, and is being released to the NCCIC/ICS-CERT website.
## 3\. RISK EVALUATION
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated
attacker to modify system settings and cause a loss of communication between
the device and the system.
## 4\. TECHNICAL DETAILS
### 4.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
Rockwell Automation reports the vulnerability affects the following PLC
products:
MicroLogix 1400 Controllers
* Series A, all versions
* Series B, v21.003 and earlier
* Series C, v21.003 and earlier
1756 ControlLogix EtherNet/IP Communications Modules
* 1756-ENBT, all versions
* 1756-EWEB
* Series A, all versions
* Series B, all versions
* 1756-EN2F
* Series A, all versions
* Series B, all versions
* Series C, v10.10 and earlier
* 1756-EN2T
* Series A, all versions
* Series B, all versions
* Series C, all versions
* Series D, v10.10 and earlier
* 1756-EN2TR
* Series A, all versions
* Series B, all versions
* Series C, v10.10 and earlier
* 1756-EN3TR
* Series A, all versions
* Series B, v10.10 and earlier
### 4.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
#### 4.2.1 [MISSING AUTHENTICATION FOR CRITICAL FUNCTION
CWE-306](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html)
An unauthenticated, remote threat actor could send a CIP connection request to
an affected device, and upon successful connection, send a new IP
configuration to the affected device even if the controller in the system is
set to Hard RUN mode. When the affected device accepts this new IP
configuration, a loss of communication occurs between the device and the rest
of the system as the system traffic is still attempting to communicate with
the device via the overwritten IP address.
[CVE-2018-17924](http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2018-17924)
has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 8.6 has been
calculated; the CVSS vector string is
([AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H)).
### 4.3 BACKGROUND
* **CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS:** Critical Manufacturing, Food and Agriculture, Transportation Systems, Water and Wastewater Systems
* **COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED:** Worldwide
* **COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION:** United States
### 4.4 RESEARCHER
David Noren reported this vulnerability to NCCIC.
## 5\. MITIGATIONS
Rockwell Automation recommends users of affected products update to an
available firmware revision that addresses the associated risk. Users who are
unable to update their firmware are directed towards additional risk
mitigation strategies provided herein and are encouraged to combine these with
the general security guidelines to employ multiple strategies simultaneously,
when possible.
Rockwell Automation suggests the following actions for affected versions:
* MicroLogix 1400 Controllers 1766-Lxxx, Series A, no direct mitigation provided. See additional mitigating recommendations below for suggested actions.
* For MicroLogix 1400 Controllers 1766-Lxxx, Series B or C, apply FRN 21.004 and later. Once the new FRN is applied, use the LCD Display to put the controller in RUN mode to prevent configuration changes. See p. 115 of the MicroLogix 1400 Programmable Controllers User Manual (1766-UM001M-EN-P) for details (available at the following location):
<https://literature.rockwellautomation.com/idc/groups/literature/documents/um/1766-um001_-en-p.pdf>
The download for FRN 21.004 can be found at the following location:
[https://compatibility.rockwellautomation.com/Pages/MultiProductDownload.aspx?Keyword=1766-L&crumb=112](https://compatibility.rockwellautomation.com/Pages/MultiProductDownload.aspx?Keyword=1766-L&crumb=112)
* 1756 EtherNet/IP Web Server Module, 1756-EWEB, all series, no direct mitigation provided. See additional mitigating recommendations below for suggested actions.
* 1756 ControlLogix EtherNet/IP Communications Modules, 1756-ENBT, all versions, 1756-EN2F Series A, all versions, Series B, all versions. 1756-EN2T, Series A, all versions, Series B, all versions, Series C, all versions. 1756-EN2TR Series A, all versions, Series B, all versions. 1756-EN3TR Series A. No direct mitigation provided. See additional mitigating recommendations below for suggested actions.
* 1756 ControlLogix EtherNet/IP Communications Modules, 1756-EN2F, Series C, 1756-EN2T, Series D, 1756-EN2TR, Series C, 1756-EN3TR, Series B. The recommendations are to apply FRN 11.001 and later. Once the new FRN is applied, enable Explicit Protected Mode. See p. 32 of the EtherNet/IP Network Configuration User Manual (ENET-UM001-EN-P) for details. Available at the following location:
<https://literature.rockwellautomation.com/idc/groups/literature/documents/um/enet-
um001_-en-p.pdf>
The download for FRN 11.001 can be found at the following location:
[https://compatibility.rockwellautomation.com/Pages/MultiProductDownload.aspx?Keyword=1756-EN&crumb=112](https://compatibility.rockwellautomation.com/Pages/MultiProductDownload.aspx?Keyword=1756-EN&crumb=112)
Rockwell Automation suggests the following additional mitigating
recommendations for affected versions:
* Utilize proper network infrastructure controls, such as firewalls, to help ensure that EtherNet/IP messages from unauthorized sources are blocked.
* Consult the product documentation for specific features, such as a hardware key switch setting, which may be used to block unauthorized changes, etc.
* Block all traffic to EtherNet/IP or other CIP protocol-based devices from outside the operational zone by blocking or restricting access to Port 2222/TCP and UDP and Port 44818 using proper network infrastructure controls, such as firewalls, UTM devices, or other security appliances. For more information on TCP/UDP Ports used by Rockwell Automation Products, see Knowledgebase Article ID 898270.
* Use trusted software, software patches, antivirus/antimalware programs and interact only with trusted websites and attachments.
* Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.
* Locate control system networks and devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network.
For additional information, Rockwell Automation recommends users continue to
monitor their advisory by subscribing to updates on the Security Advisory
Index for Rockwell Automation, located at: 54102 - Industrial Security
Advisory Index at the following location (login required):
<https://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/54102>
NCCIC recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of
exploitation of this vulnerability. Specifically, users should:
* Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure that they are [not accessible from the Internet](/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-10-301-01).
* Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network.
* When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
NCCIC reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
NCCIC also provides a section for [control systems security recommended
practices](/ics/content/recommended-practices) on the ICS-CERT web page.
Several recommended practices are available for reading and download,
including [Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-
Depth Strategies](/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-
CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf).
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly
available on the [ICS-CERT website](/ics/) in the Technical Information Paper,
[ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies](/ics/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B).
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to NCCIC for
tracking and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.
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